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The Question 
Can the governor remove issues from his proclamation convening a special 
session of the General Assembly after the legislature has convened?2 
The Answer 
A preliminary analysis of the structure and case law of the Missouri and other 
state constitutions lead to the conclusion that the governor may not remove subjects from 
his call to convene the general assembly once they have begun meeting.3  A Missouri 
                                                          
1.  Anthony W. Bonuchi is a law student at the University of Missouri – Columbia.  
2 The question is a hypothetical one in Missouri but it has historical roots.  In 2003, Governor Bob Holden 
called a special session to consider several vetoed appropriations bills.  See Journal of the Senate, First 
Extraordinary Session, 92nd General Assembly, June 2, 2003.  He subsequently sent a second message 
removing the first six items of his earlier seven item message.  See Journal of the Senate, First 
Extraordinary Session, 92nd General Assembly, June 18, 2003.  The General Assembly did not respond to 
the second message.   
3 While the federal constitution is mentioned here there was no federal case law this author could locate that 
dealt with the specific issues addressed by this paper.  
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governor may make suggestions or other recommendations, such as recommending that 
the legislature drop an issue from consideration, but the General Assembly is not required  
as a matter of law to heed such a recommendation.                      
Under Article III Section 9 of the Missouri Constitution, the governor of Missouri 
has the power to convene the legislature only upon extraordinary circumstances.  This is 
to be done by proclamation stating specifically what subject(s) the general assembly may 
consider and legislate upon during the special session.4  The legislature may not consider 
any topic other than those placed before it.5  While the governor has the agenda setting 
authority, he may not bind the general assembly to a particular course of action with 
regard to those issues contained in his call even when he attempts to limit legislative 
activity with a very narrow call.6  
 These provisions all point to the conclusion that the governor’s power over the 
general assembly ceases once it has convened, thus he may not revoke issues from his 
proclamation convening the general assembly once it has so convened.   
Analysis  
 The conclusions summarized above are based upon an analysis of the Missouri 
Constitution and caselaw from Missouri and other jurisdictions.   
  1.  The Missouri Constitution 
 The separation of powers doctrine sets the limits of the governor’s legislative 
authority.  No branch of the government may exercise the power of another branch unless 
                                                          
4 V.A.M.S  Mo. const. art. IV § 9. 
5 V.A.M.S  Mo. const. art. III § 39 cl. 7. 
4 Rice v. Edwards, 241 S.W. 945 (Mo. 1922); Wells v. Railroad Co., 19 S.W. 530, 532 (Mo. 1892); 360 
Op. Mo. Att’y Gen. 5 (1965); e.g. State Tax   Comm’n v. Preece, 1 U. 2d 337, 266 P.2d 757, 760 (1954). 
6 Rice v. Edwards, 241 S.W. 945 (Mo. 1922); Wells v. Railroad Co., 19 S.W. 530, 532 (Mo. 1892); 360 
Op. Mo. Att’y Gen. 5 (1965); e.g. State Tax   Comm’n v. Preece, 1 U. 2d 337, 266 P.2d 757, 760 (1954). 
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so provided within the constitution.7  Article IV vests the governor with executive 
authority while legislative power in the state of Missouri is vested in the House and the 
Senate.8  The governor, being the head of the executive department, may not exercise 
legislative authority other than those granted to him by the constitution.   
The constitution grants the governor the authority to convene the legislature when 
he determines an extraordinary occasion has arisen,9 he is also given the authority to veto 
legislation,10 and he has partial, line-item veto authority over appropriations bills.11   
Almost every state grants the governor powers that are thought of as legislative in 
character, including those listed above.  The reasons for allowing the governor to call 
special sessions were so clear as to not even elicit debate during the constitutional 
conventions of Missouri12 or the United States.13   The Colorado Supreme Court 
however, issued an advisory opinion to its House of Representatives late in the nineteenth 
century which sheds some light on why the provision has been adopted in the various 
states of the union.14  The Court concluded that fear of over legislation persuaded the 
framers of the Colorado Constitution to limit the amount of time the legislature could be 
in session.15  As a direct result, should a state of emergency or other crisis requiring 
                                                          
7 V.A.M.S Mo. const. art. II § 1.  
8 V.A.M.S. Mo. const. art. III § 1. 
9 V.A.M.S. Mo const. art. IV § 9. 
10 V.A.M.S. Mo const. art III § 31. 
11 V.A.M.S. Mo const. art IV § 26. 
10 Isidor Loeb, Debates in Missouri Constitutional Convention of 1875, 481 (1920).  
11 Madison’s notes from 1787 Philadelphia constitutional convention, September 8, 1787.  The members 
present passed the section allowing the President to convene Congress upon extraordinary circumstances 
without debate.    
14 In re Governor’s Proclamation, 19 Colo. 333, 35 P. 530 (1894).  The House sought to determine whether 
a proposed bill would be considered outside the subject of the Governor’s proclamation.  In stating that the 
executive could limit the scope of the special session to a particular subject matter, the Court concluded 
that any attempt to constrain legislative action within that subject was outside the boundaries of the 
Governor’s power.  
15 Id. 
  5
legislation arise, the power to convene the state assembly was placed with the executive 
and limited to extraordinary circumstances.16 
 The convening and adjourning of the General Assembly is a constitutional 
function.  The occasions that the legislature may lawfully convene and adjourn are very 
carefully spelled out in the Constitution.  They may meet in regular session,17 upon which 
they must adjourn by the second Friday of May each year.18  The legislature may convene 
itself in special session with a proclamation signed by three-fourths of the members of 
both houses if it specifically describes what subjects are to be considered.  At any time 
during regular or special sessions (whether called by the governor or the legislature) the 
legislature may adjourn itself on a majority vote of both houses.19  Although the governor 
may call a special session, the legislature convenes and adjourns that session. 
 The constitutional provisions thus far described show the power to convene the 
legislature rests with the General Assembly.  Therefore, the legislative authority granted 
to the governor by Article IV is limited and should be narrowly construed.  Allowing the 
governor to withdraw items from his call would be granting him legislative powers in 
contravention of the separation of powers doctrine.  
A simple hypothetical example illustrates the above point.  If the governor issued 
a proclamation containing only one subject, allowing him to withdraw that subject from 
consideration after the General Assembly had convened would be to allow him to 
effectively adjourn the special session himself – that is, exercise a legislative power not 
granted in the constitution.   
                                                          
16 Id. 
17 V.A.M.S. Mo. const. art. III § 20. 
18 V.A.M.S. Mo. const. art. III § 20(a).   
19 See generally V.A.M.S. Mo. const. art. III §20. 
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2. Missouri caselaw 
The following issues are well settled in Missouri constitutional law.  While they 
are not per se on point, they are very instructive as to the nature and extent of the 
governor’s authority under Article IV § 9. 
First, that it is within the sole discretion of the governor to determine whether an 
“extraordinary occasion” has arisen necessitating legislative action.20  Second, in order to 
convene the General Assembly the governor must issue a proclamation specifically 
stating the matters to be acted upon.21  Third, that the legislature may not act outside 
those subjects contained in the governor’s call.22  Subsequent gubernatorial approval of 
legislation beyond the scope of the proclamation will not render it constitutional.23  
Finally, the legislature is not bound to any particular action prayed for by the governor.24   
The governor’s order is mandatory under the extraordinary session clause as is the 
legislature’s duty to only act upon the subjects contained therein.25  Any subsequent 
action by the governor is strictly in an advisory role as the legislature is vested with all its 
Article III powers within the confines of that proclamation.        
3. Cases from other Jurisdictions 
The question posed by this report is one of first impression in Missouri and 
perhaps in any other state.  However, the Supreme Court of Nebraska and the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals have rendered decisions on a similar question:  whether the governor 
may revoke his proclamation calling the legislature into an extraordinary session before 
                                                          
20 State v. Adams, 19 S.W.2nd 671, 674 (1929). 
21  Id 
22 Rice v. Edwards, 241 S.W. 945, 948 (1922); see also, In ex parte Seward, 253 S.W. 356 (1923); Wells v. 
Railroad Co., 19 S.W. 530, 532 (1892).   
23 Id. 
24 Rice, 241 S.W. at 948; Wells, 19 S.W. at 532.   
25 Id. 
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the legislature has actually convened.26  The courts have split on the answer to that 
question.      
In Nebraska the court determined that the governor’s discretionary power did not 
end until the legislature convened.27  Therefore he may withdraw his proclamation 
convening the legislature before it meets.  This, reasoned the court, would allow him to 
save the state vast expense if the occasion which existed at time of his proclamation had 
since dissipated.28   The Arkansas and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts have both followed 
Nebraska’s lead in Parker.29 
On the other hand, the Kentucky court determined that once the proclamation was 
issued the governor’s power had ended as the legislature’s had ripened.30  As a result, the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals reasoned, the separation of powers doctrine barred the 
governor from recalling his proclamation even though the legislature had yet to 
convene.31  The Kentucky view seems to be the minority rule on this particular issue.    
Significantly, implied in both the Nebraska and Kentucky opinions is the notion 
of finality of the governor’s discretionary power.  Once the governor’s power ends, 
whether after issuing the call or upon the convening of the legislature, his constitutional 
grant of legislative authority concludes.  The governor’s power over the “form and 
subject [matter] of his proclamation continues and is plenary until the legislature has 
actually convened.” 32    
                                                          
26 People v. Parker, 3 Neb. 409, 19 Am. Rep. 634 (1872); Royster v. Laffoon, 258 Ky. 146, 79 S.W. 2d 707 
(1935). 
27 Parker, 3 Neb. 409. 
28 Id. 
29 See Foster v. Graves, 168 Ark. 1033, 275 S.W. 653, 655 (1925); Case of Pittsburgh’s Petition, 217 Pa. 
227, 66 A. 348 (1908).   
30 Royster, 258 Ky. 146.   
31 Id. 
32 Foster, 275 S.W. at 655. 
  8
Similarly, Florida’s constitution authorizes the governor to call an extraordinary 
session which once convened activates the legislative process.33  Then the legislature, by 
“the very nature of the legislative power,” controls calling recesses and adjourning the 
body.34  Taking the contrary view would allow the executive to wield unconstitutional 
legislative authority.  The power to convene a body necessary implies the power to 
prevent convention before it has accomplished that goal.35   
Conclusion 
Missouri courts would likely find that the power to remove items from his call for 
a special session is not an inherently executive power within the meaning of Article IV, 
and thus not within his discretionary authority as the supreme executive of the state.36   
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33 In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 206 So2d. 212, 215 (Fla. 1968) (The governor may not limit the 
number of days the legislature has to consider the issues in his proclamation convening extraordinary 
session.)  
34 In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 206 So. 2nd 212, 215 (Fla. 1968);  see also, Opinion of the 
Justices, 275 Ala 102, 152 So. 2d 427 (1963). 
35 Parker, 3 Neb. 409 (emphasis added). 
36 Royster, 79 S.W. 2d at 709. 
